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The COVID-19 pandemic has caused dramatic and unprecedented impacts on both global health and econ-
omies. Many governments are now proposing recovery packages to get back to normal, but the 2019 Inter-
governmental Science-Policy Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Global Assessment indi-
cated that business as usual has created widespread ecosystem degradation. Therefore, a post-COVID
world needs to tackle the economic drivers that create ecological disruptions. In this perspective, we discuss
a number of tools across a range of actors for both short-term stimulusmeasures and longer-term revamping
of global, national, and local economies that take biodiversity into account. These include measures to shift
away from activities that damage biodiversity and toward those supporting ecosystem resilience, including
through incentives, regulations, fiscal policy, and employment programs. By treating the crisis as an oppor-
tunity to reset the global economy, we have a chance to reverse decades of biodiversity and ecosystem
losses.INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused severe impacts to global
economies on a scale not seen in more than a generation.
Stay-at-home policies, widespread travel cancellations, and re-
strictions on many communal activities have all dealt a blow to
daily economic interactions. Many affluent countries hit hard
by the virus, including the United States (US) and countries within
Europe, have been planning and implementing massive invest-
ments of government stimulus in attempts to stave off dramati-
cally rising unemployment and risk of fiscal collapse. Many are
casting these efforts as an attempt to ‘‘return to normal’’ or448 One Earth 3, October 23, 2020 ª 2020 Elsevier Inc.‘‘get the economy back on track.’’ However, recent assessments
of the state of planetary health from the Intergovernmental Sci-
ence-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services
(IPBES) and other global bodies tell us that a return to normal,
pre-pandemic business as usual is not acceptable and will un-
dermine future prosperity of humans and the planet.1
Rapid degradation of ecosystems and biodiversity over the
past 50 years has put enormous stress on the natural systems
that supply humanity with food, water, and other benefits from
nature.2 The IPBES Global Assessment (GA) report, released in
May 2019, linked these changes to direct drivers such as land









































Figure 1. Economic Drivers of Biodiversity
Loss and Ecosystem Change
The Global Assessment (GA) identified five main
direct drivers of ecosystem change over the past 50
years (orange circles), leading to different aspects of
nature decline (green circles). Economic pressures
were identified as a key indirect driver in the GA, and
important elements of changes in economic supply
and demand that drive ecosystem loss are shown
here (blue circles).
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Perspectiveexploitation of wild species, climate change, invasive alien spe-
cies, and pollution, all of which, in turn, are shaped by indirect
drivers, such as demographic and social changes and economic
interests.1 In particular, the global economy has expanded
rapidly over the last half century, and the accelerating scale of
capital accumulation and trade flows in the contemporary era
have led to telecoupled and spillover effects,3 including large-
scale habitat destruction that has been linked to the emergence
of novel viral diseases, such as COVID-19 (Figure 1).4 Such
ecological degradation has long been known to pose substantial
threats because of its potential to undermine the natural re-
sources on which much economic activity is based, but until
the emergence of COVID-19 such risks seemed distant
to many.5
Now we are at a crossroads. We must not only address the
short-term economic pain caused by the pandemic, but also
think about what kind of economy we want and need for a sus-
tainable, just, and equitable future in the long term. Quick fixes
to get economies back on track are likely to fail to address the
deep pre-existing sustainability and inequality challenges we
face, requiring care and consideration of nature and justice tobe part of any solution. Evidence suggests
that many citizens of the US and European
Union (EU) countries agree that a post-
COVID-19 world must reflect attention to
values such as improving the environment,
tackling climate change, and ensuring so-
cial equity.6
While many scientists and politicians
have been making the arguments for a
COVID-19 recovery that is low-carbon,7
there has been much less attention to
how to include biodiversity and ecosys-
tems in such transitions. Discussions of
nature-related actions related to the cur-
rent pandemic have primarily focused on
closing wildlife markets as a potential
source of novel viruses, expanding pro-
tected natural areas, or reducing tropical
deforestation.4,8,9 While these can all be
important actions, they do not necessarily
get at the heart of the wider issues and
drivers that create economic demands
and ecological disruptions in the first
place. Furthermore, concrete policies to
promote better management of biodiver-
sity and ecosystems have not been priori-
tized in the majority of economic recoverypackages; most proposed measures, when they include atten-
tion to the environment, have focused on climate. Only a few
countries have identified nature-based investments or policies
in their stimulus proposals (Figure 2), and even there, support
is generally well under 10% of total funding.10 A number of coun-
tries, the US and China among them, have allocated essentially
zero stimulus funds to biodiversity or ecosystems.
In fact, there are a number of steps and policies that would aid
economic reconstruction while at the same time addressing
many of the root causes of biodiversity loss, including connec-
tions with zoonotic diseases. At the minimum, recovery pack-
ages should ‘‘do no harm’’ to ecosystems, and at their most
ambitious, longer-term efforts could transform the global eco-
nomic system to better address a number of interlocked biodi-
versity, climate, and well-being challenges. We revisit some of
the analysis from the IPBES GA to help provide suggestions on
transforming economic processes, policies, and institutions to
reduce pressures on natural systems and encourage a resilient
recovery, which in turn might make pandemics driven by the hu-
man-wildlife interface less likely in the future. The tools that we
discuss herein should be seen as a range of potentially usefulOne Earth 3, October 23, 2020 449
Figure 2. Post-COVID Economic Stimulus and Recovery Packages
As of September 15, 2020, a number of governments have adopted or proposed economic recovery packages, including stimulus funding, in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Only a limited number of countries have included climate or biodiversity measures in their packages, and a number have introduced
measures that would have negative impacts (such as reducing environmental taxes or regulatory enforcement). Data on recovery proposals for selected countries
can be found in a public dataset as noted in Resource Availability.
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Perspectiveoptions for a variety of actors and contexts; while not every
country, locality, or company will be able to do all of them, our
analysis is meant to show that we do have a suite of approaches
to rebound and restructure economies in an ecologically trans-
formative manner (Table S1).
IMMEDIATE NEEDS AND SHORT-TERM PRIORITIES
Shift from Harmful Subsidies to Beneficial Ones
In an era of rising fiscal red ink, environmentally harmful sub-
sidies make neither economic nor ecological sense. In 2015,
agricultural support potentially harmful to nature amounted to
US$100 billion in OECD countries alone, while fossil fuel sub-
sidies, which generate both end-carbon emissions and water
and land pollution at sites of extraction, processing, and
disposal, range between US$300 and $680 billion per year glob-
ally and result in estimated global damages of at least US$4 tril-
lion in externalities, offsetting any economic advantage they
confer.11,12,13 Additionally, many governments subsidize fishing
by national fleets, estimated to be over US$35 billion per year,
often encouraging overfishing and exceeding the net economic
benefit obtained.14 Overall, the amount of finance mobilized to
promote and preserve biodiversity is conservatively estimated
to be outweighed by environmentally harmful subsidies by a fac-
tor of ten.11
Subsidies are not in and of themselves inherently bad; they are
a useful tool for governments to make investments in areas that
can promote ecosystem resilience. However, many of the orig-450 One Earth 3, October 23, 2020inal goals of subsidies, such as maintaining economic viability
of rural areas or supporting new industries, can be equally well
achieved by promoting public goods rather than supporting
overexploitation. Yet subsidy reform is often challenged by
vested interests;15 for example, the recent turmoil in global oil
markets has increased lobbying for retaining fossil fuel subsidies
rather than ending them. Studies of subsidy reforms undertaken
by a handful of countries suggest the need to: act quickly when
presented with windows of opportunity that may be outside the
influence of domestic policymakers and unrelated to the environ-
ment (for example, current health crises); build alliances between
economic and environmental interests in common; devise tar-
geted measures to address potential impacts on competitive-
ness and income distribution; build a robust evidence base on
the social costs and benefits of reform; and encourage broad
stakeholder engagement.16
Existing positive subsidies related to biodiversity that could be
improved and expanded include support to farmers who
conserve and better provision ecosystem health on their lands,
an approach used in both the USConservation Reserve Program
and the EUCommonAgricultural Policy. However, in both cases,
positive subsidies to encourage environmentally friendly farming
practices (e.g., conservation set-asides, organic agriculture, in-
tegrated farm management, and preservation of landscape of
high-value habitats) are usually outweighed by other subsidies
that lead to overproduction, agricultural expansion, or livestock
production that contributes to greenhouse gas emissions.17,18
To achieve benefits from positive subsidies to agriculture,
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Perspectiveevidence suggests they need to be spatially targeted to areas of
high biodiversity in order to disincentivize extensification, rather
than current models of enrolling volunteers or larger farms, and
focus on results-based payments for the most ecologically valu-
able practices.19,20
One additional form of public subsidy that can be used to sup-
port biodiversity-friendly food production is through public pro-
curement. Just as government purchases of medical supplies
has spurred needed production for the COVID-19 response,
the power of public purchasing of food grown using biodiver-
sity-protecting approaches can increase local production of
more sustainable food choices and encourage an upscaling of
investments.21,22 While there have been strong debates about
whether or not organic and other low-resource input agriculture
may lead to lower yields, implying a risk of increased expansion
of agricultural land, there is evidence that new forms of knowl-
edge-intensive practices that are supported by and protect
ecosystem services in agriculture can in fact deliver healthy, sus-
tainable, and affordable food, especially when combined with
other measures, such as dietary changes to reduce consump-
tion of meat and dairy.23,24 Specific sustainable intensification
practices, depending on context, can include precision
agriculture, enhanced biocontrol/integrated pest management,
ecological infrastructure (e.g., grass strips or permaculture),
and diversified agro-forestry or agro-pastoral systems; these ap-
proaches have in common a focus on improving agro-ecological
functions such as nutrient cycling, soil conservation, and biodi-
versity promotion (especially for pollinators and soil health).25
Expand New Taxation Policies for Environmental Harms
Environmental policy has a long history of using environmental
taxes to reduce pollution and increase resource-use efficiency,
such as gas taxes or plastic bag fees; however, very few direct
consumption or other taxes have been designed specifically to
preserve biodiversity. Many taxes on activities or products exert-
ing negative (and often indirect) effects on ecosystems and
biodiversity rely either on the polluter-pay principle or on the
user-pay principle, which can serve to nudge people toward
certain behaviors, but most existing taxes are too low to signifi-
cantly reduce negative impacts.26 Well-designed pricing mech-
anisms serve as consumer incentives and can raise sources of
revenue for local, state, and national governments.27 A wide
range of ecosystem-related taxes could be increased and
expanded, including: resource extraction taxes (e.g., timber);
pesticide taxes; diffuse pollution taxes, including water pollution
charges and taxes; air pollution and gasoline taxes, given that air
pollutants harm ecosystems through acidification and eutrophi-
cation of inland waters; carbon taxes; and waste and packaging
taxes.28 The experience of a recent increase in the carbon tax in
France, which was met by protests from the Yellow Vests move-
ment, may seem a discouraging example, but in fact well-de-
signed taxes that include a way to address equity concerns so
that they do not unfairly fall on certain populations are likely to
receive more public support.29 For example, proposals for a car-
bon fee or tax that is paired with a dividend or rebate to house-
holds can help solve these problems, since a majority of mostly
low- and middle-income families would receive more money
back than they would spend in higher taxes in a progressively
designed scheme.30 Others have also suggested using carbontaxes to directly support biodiversity efforts, such as Costa Ri-
ca’s fuel tax that funds payments for forest protection
programs.31
Public education efforts are essential to convey the message
that environmental taxes are incentives that have measurable
environmental impacts and are not merely instruments for
financing the state budget. Psychological factors also matter,
and one promising approach is ‘‘bonus-malus’’ (Latin for good-
bad) schemes, in which negative behaviors are taxed and
positive ones subsidized; such amechanism is widely used in in-
surance premiums and has a proven incentive effect. In France, a
bonus-malus was applied to car purchases starting in 2009 ac-
cording to their CO2 emissions, leading to an increase in buyers
of small-engine cars and an even bigger drop in purchases of
large ones.32 The idea could be adapted to budget-balanced
‘‘ecological bonus-malus’’ schemes that punish or reward ac-
cording to the damage to biodiversity inflicted or avoided.33
Concerningly, however, rather than seeking to increase taxes
on some industries causing environmental damage or pursue
novel financing strategies, some post-COVID recovery pack-
ages are actually moving in the opposite direction by reducing
taxes and relaxing regulations, a short-term strategy for eco-
nomic stimulus that is likely to have longer-term negative health
and environmental consequences (Figure 2; Table S2).34
Governments can also seek to reform tax havens and retain
more revenue at home in an era of tightening belts. Offshore
and hidden accounts reduce the amount of financing available
to governments for global public goods provisioning and provide
bad actors with opportunities to avoid financial scrutiny,
reducing the impact of policies such as certification or supply-
chain monitoring. A recent study found that 70% of known fish-
ing vessels implicated in illegal fishing are flagged in a tax haven,
and that nearly 70% of foreign capital to the largest companies
raising soy and beef in the Amazon, prime drivers of deforesta-
tion, were channeled through tax havens.35 Preventing
companies who use tax havens from reaping any benefits of
post-COVID recovery money from public coffers is one possible
approach.
Guide Recovery to Support Biodiversity and Do No Harm
In the short term, as the private sector seeks grants and loans to
shore up payrolls and ensure the possibility of longer-term
viability, governments can seek to prioritize support for those
businesses that do not harm biodiversity and put restrictions
on those that accept investment. For example, after the 2008–
2009 automotive company bailout in the US, the Obama admin-
istration had leverage to work with carmanufacturers to increase
fuel economy standards, and the 2009 American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act provided numerous loans and tax credits to-
ward greener vehicle development.36
Similar plans could be required for businesses receiving
COVID-19 bailout funds, including having biodiversity risk-miti-
gation plans, requiring disclosures of impact, or building
ecosystem considerations into decision-making, particularly
for industries with demonstrated impacts on and risks to biodi-
versity (e.g., agribusiness, apparel, mining, and energy, among
others).37 Other relevant examples of conditionality could
include requirements for the cruise industry to minimize their
considerable contribution to ocean pollution38 while airlinesOne Earth 3, October 23, 2020 451
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Perspectivecould be required to tackle reduced carbon emissions as part of
their receipt of public funds (currently being required in France’s
stimulus). So far, Canada has proposed that bailout funds to
large corporations will require adherence to carbon disclosure
standards, while the ‘‘no significant harm principle’’ of the EU
states that none of the expenditures in the budget from 2021
to 2027 can be spent on things that would have negative impacts
on environmental priorities. Beyond these examples, currently
few strings are being attached to stimulus or bailout money in
other countries. Conditionality measures and standards would
need to be combined with transparency as to where bailout
funds and stimulus investments are being directed, so as to
harness public scrutiny of these efforts.39 While there may be
concerns that conditions on bailout assistance could technically
affect competitiveness, bailouts can themselves confer an unfair
competitive advantage; therefore, net outcomes would depend
on the balance between these forces, and it can be reasonable
to limit that advantage by imposing conditionality.
Fund Ecosystem-Focused Work Programs and Income
Support
In the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis, government-
supported work programs can be essential in reducing wide-
spread unemployment, and conservation jobs in particular can
be scaled up rapidly. Just as the Works Progress Administration
and Civilian Conservation Corps were used in the US during the
Great Depression, jobs in ecological restoration and green infra-
structure could be a source of both employment and ecological
benefits.40 Given current demands for increased racial justice,
and the disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on communities
of color in the US in particular, such employment programs
can be targeted to these harder-hit areas, such as in urban
ecosystem restoration and green infrastructure.41 A recent sur-
vey of economists found that stimulus measures focused on
green sectors (both biodiversity and climate) were rated among
the most positive potential measures, delivering both short- and
long-term economic and societal benefits, while airline bailouts
were rated as the worst stimulus option.7 Experience shows
that these investments work; marine restoration projects funded
as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in 2009
generated more jobs per million US dollars invested than many
other sectors, such as fossil fuels.42 A study submitted to Aus-
tralia’s government estimates that AUS $4billion in conserva-
tion-oriented post-COVID stimulus would create over 50,000
jobs working on nature-related activities.43 Many payments for
ecosystem services programs globally have been used to sup-
port employment in activities such as invasive species removal,
reforestation and restoration, and other investments in both peo-
ple and nature, and these could be rapidly upscaled as they usu-
ally have more demand than finances allow.44
The COVID-19 pandemic has also opened space for consider-
ation of emergency ‘‘universal basic income’’ (UBI) proposals,
such as paying US $2,000 per personmonthly until the pandemic
subsides, as a quick, efficient, non-bureaucratic method to put
cash into people’s hands.45 There are a range of potential varia-
tions on UBI as a way to realize a ‘‘social protection floor,’’ an
idea that was approved at the 2012 UN Convention on Sustain-
able Development Rio+20 conference. UBI in developing coun-
tries can be a particularly useful way of alleviating poverty, which452 One Earth 3, October 23, 2020in turn can have knock-on effects such as preventing deforesta-
tion.46 In developed country contexts, UBI can be more contro-
versial, in part because of its apparent cost, and in part because
of arguments that more benefit can be achieved with a given
amount of revenue throughmore targeted or conditional benefits
(e.g., means-tested welfare payments or unemployment in-
surance).47,48
What has often gone unmentioned in these discussions is that
UBI could have biodiversity impacts as well, although the overall
environmental consequences of UBI are still under discussion,
with little empirical evidence so far.49 A subsistence-level UBI
has been suggested as a way to facilitate simpler lifestyles
with smaller ecological footprints, and to valorize unpaid work
(often performed by women) such as child raising, work in the
arts, or volunteer activity that typically have a lower carbon foot-
print than paid labor but which provide significant public bene-
fits.50 Recent proposals for a ‘‘conservation basic income’’
have made the argument that poverty alleviation and environ-
mental goals could be packaged together and applied to
everyone living near areas of high conservation value.51 The
cost of UBI subsidies could be raised via environmental sources
such as carbon or pollution taxeswhereby the revenue is then re-
distributed, or by redesigning development aid to recipient coun-
tries. Other related programs, such as conditional cash transfers
(CCT), have shown that direct payments can result in both pos-
itive and negative environmental behaviors depending on
context, and thus must be designed carefully; one recent anal-
ysis of a CCT program in Indonesia shows that it reduced defor-
estation although it was not designed for conservation ends,52
while a CCT in Sierra Leone was associated with higher rates
of forest clearance.53 Overall, the effectiveness of payments
(conditional or not) will be dependent on whether incentives
are structured in appropriate ways and whether the hoped-for
pro-environmental outcomes are considered locally legitimate.54
A ROADMAP FOR LONGER-TERM ECONOMIC
STRATEGIES
In the longer term, both governments and market actors must
aim to achieve a more sustainable economy that better inte-
grates the protection of nature. The GA assessed a series of pos-
sibilities, based on evidence of effectiveness of existing policies
and scenarios, of what future worlds might look like, declaring a
need for ‘‘incorporating the reduction of inequalities into devel-
opment pathways, reducing overconsumption and waste and
addressing environmental impacts, such as externalities of eco-
nomic activities, from the local to the global scales.’’1 Here we
focus on some key steps that can be taken to ensure such trans-
formative economic changes (Figure 3).
Rethink Production and Supply-Chain Models
Shorter and more localized supply chains are likely to be inevi-
table in a post-COVID-19 world, as the current just-in-time
models have revealed themselves to be vulnerable to interrup-
tions.55 Many already faced systemic risks inherent in tightly
connected yet fragile commodity chains and the dependency
of businesses on ecosystem services that are overused or
increasingly homogenized.56 For example, over the past several
decades commodity chain verticalization in agribusiness has
Figure 3. Actions to Reform the Global
Economy to Reduce Impacts on Nature
Both short- and long-term actions across multiple
sectors and actors are needed to address global
economic impacts on biodiversity.
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Perspectivecreated the conditions for overproduction, driven in part by pri-
vate equity investments that pressure many producers to cut
costs, the collapse of international commodity agreements that
have resulted in increased production even when not met by de-
mand, and current trade rules that encourage unsustainable
sourcing.57 Given that the experience from COVID-19 is likely
to significantly alter a number of production systems, there is a
need to be pro-active in maximizing positive ecological impacts
and minimizing negative welfare impacts of supply-chain
changes.
Food production is the supply system of primary global
concern; some national governments have restricted exports
of food in response to the crisis, and many are now seeking to
balance food security concerns with developing more localized
supply chains that can contribute to food sovereignty.58 Short-
ening food chains involves reducing intermediaries (such as
wholesalers, processors, or shippers) and focusing on better
linking supply with markets, including direct-to-consumers
(e.g., farmers’ markets, community-supported agriculture),
expanded community food production (e.g., urban gardens,
seed exchanges), and decreased corporate control (e.g., coop-
eratives rather than vertically structured agribusinesses).59 Such
steps have the potential to lead to local foodsheds that increase
traceability and consumer confidence, improve product quality
(including freshness and health concerns), and lower environ-
mental impacts (including reduced packaging, decreased food
waste, and closing nutrient cycles, although the impact on car-
bon emissions remains highly dependent on context).60 Howev-
er, shifting from global supply chains to more localized produc-
tion will be challenging in balancing efficiency with resilience,
and will need to be planned with the participation of multiple
stakeholders, including consumers. While some previous
studies of ‘‘buying local’’ have warned about decreasing welfare
from less consumption due to higher prices,61 from a sustainabil-
ity perspective this definition of welfare is inadequate. There are
also non-economic social benefits of shorter supply chains that
can be recognized, including reconnections of cities and neigh-
boring rural populations as well as fostering senses of steward-
ship, culture, and place.62At the same time, global trade will
continue to be needed, particularly as
many areas cannot supply sufficient food
locally.63 Thus these efforts can be sup-
ported by reformed trade agreements,
which need to shift from their dominant
focus on trade liberalization toward
securing fairness, equity, and sustainabil-
ity, including rules that provide greater pol-
icy space for governments to prioritize and
support local production standards.64
Work within the World Trade Organization
has aimed at eliminating economically dis-torting subsidies, but could be expanded by creating a true
‘‘green box’’ for biodiversity-friendly initiatives to encourage
elimination of ecologically harmful subsidies and overproduction
stimulated by trade. Other trade reforms include the EU’s
consideration of carbon border taxes to discourage leakage,
and similar steps could be taken for green production supply
chains that avoid land-based emissions and preserve biodiver-
sity in particular.65 Reforming global trade and production will
also require multinational corporations to move away from the
paradigm that their primary business aim is to maximize divi-
dends for shareholders, which often encourages unsustainable
overproduction.66
Rethink Ways to Reduce Excess Consumption
Consumption is a major driver of unsustainable production, and
the GA noted that countries could focus on ‘‘improving stan-
dards, systems and relevant regulations aimed at internalizing
the external costs of production, extraction and consumption
(such as pricing wasteful or polluting practices, including
through penalties); promoting resource efficiency and circular
and other economic models; voluntary environmental and social
certification of market chains; and incentives that promote sus-
tainable practices and innovation.’’1 The COVID-19 pandemic
may accelerate trends toward reduced consumption, given
massively reduced travel and rethinking of what counts as a
good quality of life.67 However, many immediate stimulus mea-
sures that have been proposed focus on increased consump-
tion, such as reductions in value-added taxes (VAT), without
much attention to the ecological impacts of such actions
(Figure 2; Table S2).
Steps to reduce excess consumption can include both incen-
tives and regulations: targeting consumer behavior with tools
such as education initiatives, choice architecture, and collabora-
tive consumption (such as sharing and reuse), as well as
resource-use caps and taxes and changes in subsidies that
encourage overproduction.68,69 Concerns about ‘‘individual
choice’’ likely need to be reframed in terms of ‘‘freedom to enjoy
a good quality of life within ecological boundaries’’ in order to
foster more support for such ideas. Universal agreement onOne Earth 3, October 23, 2020 453
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achieved, but work on how to operationalize concepts such as
‘‘consumption corridors’’ and ‘‘doughnut economies’’ for accep-
tance by the public is gaining political traction.70 The concepts of
circular economies and decoupling resource use and economic
growth (or even exploring degrowth) are also increasingly popu-
lar topics of discussion and research, but not yet widespread in
empirical practice.71 Some have posited that transitions within
economic sectors, such as from resource-intensive production
of natural resources to more service-oriented or financially ori-
ented economies (which may be accelerated by COVID-19
work-from-home trends), would lead to smaller environmental
impacts. Evidence suggests, however, that consumption by
those working in the service sectors may outweigh gains from
shifts in production, indicating that both production and con-
sumption strategies need to go hand in hand.72 Overall, the
conclusion of several recent reports is that no sustainable future
that meets both human needs and stays within planetary bound-
aries is possible without decreases in excess consumption.73,74
Shift Fiscal Policies to Reflect Environmental Values
Currently governments have a great deal of concern about how
they will balance budgets and manage long-term fiscal
stressors, particularly subnational authorities with yearly require-
ments for balanced budgets and the inability to borrow or go into
debt. This is forcing hard choices that have long-term conse-
quences; for example, New York City, facing a budget deficit
of at least US$7 billion in lost tax revenue since the pandemic,
has proposed a more than 10% cut to the city’s parks depart-
ment budget, despite green space having been an important
physical and mental health benefit during lockdown policies.75
In light of these challenges, ensuring that state fiscal policies
continue to reflect environmental values is important, and novel
financing can help subnational areas balance their budgets. For
example, ecological fiscal transfers (EFT) are a policy instrument
used to redistribute tax revenues among public actors based on
ecological or conservation-related indicators (such as the quan-
tity and quality of protected areas or forest areas). These fiscal
redistribution formulas can be a means to compensate munici-
palities for their conservation expenses or paying for the spillover
benefits of related areas beyond municipal boundaries.76 To
date, there are only a few countries globally that have imple-
mented EFT (such as Brazil, India, Portugal, and France),
although there is good potential to do so with low transaction
costs.77,78 For example, in 2015, India started distributing
7.5% of its national-level tax revenue based on state forest cover
indicators, and from 2020 onward will use 10%.79 Such ap-
proaches can be encouraged and expanded to assist local gov-
ernments in supporting conservation while also providing oppor-
tunities for citizens to enjoy more green spaces.
Incentivize Financial Sector on Nature-Related Risks
For the financial sector, including banks, wealth and pension
funds, private equity, insurance companies, and others, a mix
of regulations and incentives can encourage investments in in-
dustries and technologies that reduce pressures on nature.80,81
The FIRE sector (finance, insurance, and real estate) is increas-
ingly implicated in biodiversity loss; for example, privately
funded large-scale land acquisitions in many tropical countries,454 One Earth 3, October 23, 2020particularly for export commodities, have been linked to higher
rates of deforestation, even outside the investment lands,82
and increased farmland prices resulting from investments in
specialized real estate trusts may drive agricultural expansion
that leads to ecosystem alteration.83 Trends toward securitiza-
tion, represented in commodity index funds, futures markets,
and derivatives markets, have grown dramatically, are increas-
ingly complex, are often traded in algorithmic automation, and
are mostly disconnected from actual material flows of
goods.84,85 Futures contracts are a key factor in the production
and trade of agricultural commodities such as soy, coffee, and
palm oil, and while they offer potential income stability to
manage risks for producers, they are also an opportunity for
speculation and hedging on price movements that have environ-
mental implications. While there is a robust debate on whether
agricultural derivatives markets contributed to higher and more
volatile food prices in 2007–2008, there is growing evidence
that speculation at least played a role in exacerbating price
spikes, which in turn drove investment in the expansion of pro-
duction.86
As such, a precautionary approach with respect to financial
speculation and nature-related financial risk is warranted, given
potentially catastrophic tail risks or tipping points that remain
largely unknown and are inherently difficult to predict accu-
rately.56,87 As has been recently experienced with both pan-
demics and climate change, the potential negative economic
impact of finding oneself on the wrong side of such tail risks is
so high that the most economically efficient approach would
be to err on the side of caution.88 The 2008–2009 market crash
was partly driven by a change in asset value behavior at the mar-
gins and consequently inspired a set of precautionary financial
regulations;89 thus, similar investments that could cause multi-
trillion-dollar losses through environmental harms could be
considered at least as risky, and regulated accordingly.80,90
Given the importance of understanding and managing risk,
engaging the financial sector can be an important potential pres-
sure point to curb the negative impacts of public and private ac-
tors on the environment.37,91 The Network for Greening the
Financial System has noted that central banks can play a key
role to ensure environmental standards are set and met, with
the EU’s new sustainable finance guidelines as one example;
these standards provide for liability of banks for the socio-envi-
ronmental impact of their investments, and could be accelerated
in the post-COVID recovery.92 Indeed, research shows that
banks that adopt environmental standards show less exposure
to risk.93 Emphasizing the risks of ‘‘stranded assets’’ (such as
oil reserves) has been an effective strategy to guide divestment
in the fossil fuel sector;94 this model could be translated to biodi-
versity concerns, such as by emphasizing the risks that come
with agribusiness investments that might have liabilities around
pesticide pollution or loss of crucial pollinators.95
While securities, derivatives, and other speculative financial
instruments can bring considerable ecological and economic
risks, more secure options exist in capital markets, such as
‘‘green’’ bonds, which raise funds for both private and public in-
vestment in sustainable projects, and these may seem more
attractive in a recovery economy. Green bonds have raised hun-
dreds of billions for renewable energy and infrastructure for low-
carbon futures;96 however, similar initiatives for biodiversity are
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Perspectivenot yet in place, as less than 3% of the existing bond market
goes to agriculture and forestry investments.97 Green invest-
ment banks (GIBs) are another tool being pioneered, with gov-
ernment guarantees, insurance, or minimum returns on invest-
ment as inducements to increase private financing. While most
GIBs have targeted low-carbon infrastructure, there is potential
for these banks to extend their work in biodiversity investments
(e.g., in ecological restoration).98
Improved financial standards also need to be tied to public
disclosure of information. Studies of corporate social responsi-
bility standards, labeling and certification, and other voluntary
actions suggest that these approaches can be effective given
the right circumstances.99 For example, a small number of asset
managers and institutional investors hold considerable shares of
companies implicated in ecosystem changes in the Amazon and
boreal forests, which could be a leverage point.100 Shareholder
activism and socially conscious investment around climate often
uses information from the Carbon Disclosure Project to evaluate
risks and impacts of participating corporate entities;101 similar
reporting and disclosure around biodiversity and ecosystem im-
pacts could help direct investment as well as provide reputa-
tional boosts.102 However, these voluntary instruments are usu-
ally limited by a lack of systematic monitoring and reporting of
impacts of sourcing practices, concerns about ‘‘greenwashing,’’
and insufficient economic benefits for companies to adopt sus-
tainable practices in the first place.103 Investment standards and
statutes could expand fiduciary responsibilities to address some
of these problems;104 for example, use of third-party beneficiary
standing would allow outside parties to take legal action if prin-
ciples adopted by companies are not followed.
Ensure Continued International Conservation Funding
Although governments will be financially strapped for the fore-
seeable future, there will still be a need to support global funding
for conservation and sustainable development initiatives, both in
the immediate short term and over time. Currently, most coun-
tries spend only a fraction (less than 1%) of their GDP on ‘‘biodi-
versity-related activities,’’ for either domestic support or foreign
environmental aid,105 and while private investment has been
substantial in the past, it is likely to be under strain given current
economic challenges.106 Even before the pandemic, existing
funding was insufficient: for example, fully implementing activ-
ities under the existing Aichi Biodiversity Targets was estimated
to require up to US$440 billion in investment to seriously tackle
biodiversity loss.107 Increasing corporate contributions toward
conservation, such as from agribusiness and fishing industries
that depend on healthy ecosystems, has been suggested as
part of a revamped global biodiversity accord.108
Now, needs are even greater. Rising unemployment and food
insecurity in the global South as a result of COVID-19 will likely
increase pressure on local ecosystems, such as expansion of
agriculture or the wildlife trade, which enhances the risk of future
epidemics. There is already evidence that falling ecotourism dol-
lars and reduced ranger activity as a result of COVID-19 has had
seriously negative consequences in many conservation
areas.109 Some small-scale fisheries, which employ 90%of peo-
ple in the fishing industry, have virtually collapsed as China has
no longer imported their products since the virus emerged.110
Consequently, ensuring employment and livelihood protectionsfor these workers in resource sectors and expanding conserva-
tion areas has been suggested by some NGOs as a priority for
global aid packages.111,112 However, increasing funding for na-
ture conservation alone will not be sufficient if the indirect drivers
of biodiversity loss are not addressed, and therefore needs to be
in concert with the other steps outlined above, some of which
can raise potentially significant amounts of revenue to help close
funding gaps.113
Address Inequality in Sustainable Recoveries
Economic inequality is problematic on its own but also generates
poorer environmental outcomes; for example, income inequality
is associated with excess consumption and higher carbon emis-
sions among richer classes,114,115 and more unequal countries
also tend to have higher rates of loss of biodiversity.116 Inequality
works in several ways, by both increasing risks and changing
collective incentives to tackle environmental problems. For
example, burdens of environmental risk also tend to fall on those
of lower income classes; poorer and minority communities often
face ‘‘pollution inequity,’’ in that they are not only exposed to
more pollution but their ecological footprints are smaller and
they cause less pollution.117 Inequality can also decrease peo-
ple’s motivation to participate in biodiversity conservation mea-
sures if they do not see the potential benefits of doing so,118 and
can undermine democratic decision-making to protect collective
public goods.119
Traditional policies to tackle inequality, such as fairer taxation,
fees on wealth transfer, and other measures, can be combined
with attention to biodiversity: for example, VAT on luxury goods
with higher negative environmental costs.120Minimumwage pol-
icies also have potentially positive environmental impacts,121
and sustainable life-cycle assessments for products could, for
example, include living wages for employees as a criterion.122
Moving toward amore sustainable economymay create inequal-
ities in and of itself, such as job displacements in certain sectors
(e.g., fossil fuels).123 The concept of just transitions captures the
idea that any transformation to a more sustainable economy
should not fall on the backs of those already suffering dispropor-
tionate impacts. Combining economic measures to reduce
inequality with stimulus investments in major retooling of energy,
land use, and other sectors can help facilitate this more just tran-
sition.124
Adopt New Economic Metrics and Models
The GA called for ‘‘a shift beyond standard economic indicators
such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to include those able to
capture more holistic, long-term views of economics and quality
of life.’’1 Changing the metrics used to assess the economy re-
flects the increasing evidence of the limitations and biases of
dominant measures of welfare such as GDP and the ways in
which they promote economic growth and associated unsus-
tainable practices.125 Replacing or broadening them with alter-
native measures of social welfare would allow inclusion of
diverse values and indicators of well-being.126 Metrics such as
the Index of Sustainable EconomicWelfare or the Genuine Prog-
ress Indicator often subtract ‘‘bads’’ such as environmental
degradation and biodiversity loss in monetary terms and add in
‘‘goods’’ not traditionally included in GDP, such as the value of
unpaid work.127 Other approaches such as Material FlowOne Earth 3, October 23, 2020 455
Figure 4. Enabling Policy Change through
Crises and Social Tipping Points
Both ‘‘social tipping points’’ (in which small changes
move across a threshold into a rapid non-linear
transformation) and external crises (such as di-
sasters) create new ways of envisioning and
engaging in policy change. Empirical examples of
policy change suggest that new agendas are set
and policies diffused through several mechanisms
within both government and the private sector.
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environment and ecosystems, and which can account for the
movement of resources across geopolitical borders, have been
developed in the past two decades.128,129 Increasingly, account-
ing systems such as the UN System of National Accounts are
adopting these new metrics,130 and local, regional, and national
governments have shown interest in these measures as well.131
While there is as yet insufficient empirical evidence of the effec-
tiveness of the new environmental accounting approaches, they
are helpful as a tool to facilitate dialog on the diverse values of
nature.
CONCLUSIONS
Envisioning a Sustainable Economic Future
Disruptive change has been identified as an important impetus to
dramatic sustainability transformations.132 We currently have a
unique opportunity to seize the moment and consider the econ-
omy we want and need for a sustainable, just, and equitable
future in a post-pandemic world.133 Simply tinkering with the sta-
tus quo was always likely to be inadequate to meet the large-
scale challenge represented by the biodiversity crisis; therefore,
taking advantage of the current COVID-19 situation to change
course and rethink both conservation and how we manage the
global economy is opportune.134,135 Societies now have to
decide whether they should try to get back on the previous
development path or define a new one. Most of us have now
had novel experiences around what is truly ‘‘essential’’ during
a pandemic, and insofar as the definition of sustainability in-
cludes providing what is necessary for a dignified and good qual-
ity of life within planetary boundaries, the baseline for this has
likely shifted since early 2020.
Social tipping points are defined as the emergent thresholds
where small socioeconomic changes may suddenly shift into
non-linear outcomes, often driven by positive feedback or
cascading mechanisms.136 Although there is disagreement as
to how these tipping points emerge, examples of these ‘‘conta-
gious processes’’ include rapid technological uptake, changing456 One Earth 3, October 23, 2020social norms and behaviors, and economic
shifts that are difficult to predict but often
take on a life of their own.137,138 External
shocks may (but not always) precipitate
such tipping points, and there are
numerous examples of both positive and
negative policy change in the aftermath of
crises, including the passage of the Clean
Water Act in the US after widely publicized
river disasters or Germany’s shift awayfrom nuclear power after the Fukushima nuclear accident of
2011.139,140 What these ‘‘focusing events’’ have in common is
that they are non-routine, such that existing interest groups
become disrupted and new coalitions come about, political
and policy learning rapidly increases, and crisis management
becomes valued in the aftermath.141 Thus, successfully trans-
lating shifts in norms or new baselines for action into agenda
setting and policy diffusion for sustainability is likely to require
new interest group engagement, diffusion of ideas through social
networks, and acknowledgment of the value of multiple scales
for action.142,143 At the same time, corporations seeking trans-
formative change have utilized strategies that have included a
mix of information sharing on new practices, corporate leader-
ship, and political coalition building (Figure 4).144
To date, however, paths toward a remade post-COVID world
have been limited. While there was extremely rapid policy ac-
tion in the stay-at-home orders and enormous budgets that
were passed for economic relief, the fact that we are not seeing
significant progress on tying stimulus measures to more funda-
mental recalibration is worrisome, and indeed some post-
COVID recovery measures are taking us in the wrong direction.
Reducing taxes, subsidizing fossil fuel production, and relaxing
environmental regulations are all ‘‘recovery’’ steps currently be-
ing taken by countries from Canada to Vietnam (Figure 2; Table
S2). Even more ambitious proposed policies, such as the Green
New Deal in the US, which focuses on investments in both low-
carbon infrastructure and ecological restoration, tackle prob-
lems primarily through a vision of expanded Keynesian eco-
nomics.145 Such an approach does not adequately address
the larger issue of how to reform the global economic drivers
of biodiversity loss and climate change we have outlined
here, such as telecoupled international trade and financializa-
tion of production.
Integrating nature across economic and public sectors will
require bold visions that few countries seemwilling to undertake,
although a handful of roadmaps to ‘‘build back better’’ have been
proposed by influential organizations.146,147 Piecemeal steps,
particularly those that treat biodiversity, climate, and COVID-
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Perspective19 as separate problems, are unlikely to bring about transforma-
tive change, and there is evidence for public support in the US at
least for combining climate, social, and economic policies.148 A
toolbox approach, such as that presented here, in which a range
of options are assessed and deployed in policy mixes is likely to
be more effective than single ‘‘silver bullet’’ solutions, and clear
linkage between short-term recovery and longer-term invest-
ment is needed.27 This is because our existing problems are
complex with numerous drivers and hence many tools are
needed over time, but also because political necessity requires
a range of options that appeal to different audiences and that
can be taken up by different actors.33,56
How to move policymakers or business leaders to increase
their ambitions remains a crucial question, but major environ-
mental reports, including the GA and the recent finding that
countries have missed all 20 Aichi targets, have drawn attention
to the lack of progress toward sustainability, revealing the limits
of our current approaches and the slowness of change.149 The
COVID crisis may have provided an opening for possibilities
that were not available even 6 months ago, as the public has
increased their expectations of engagement from multiple
levels of government and the private sector. Overall, envision-
ing and implementing a new economic paradigm that tackles
the many challenges we face will be a substantial task,
requiring a transformative vision that takes advantage of this
unique crisis situation before us; such an approach will entail
a reshaping of the multiple incentives and policies that steer
the global economy in ways that preserve, rather than under-
mine, biodiversity and sets our world on a path to ecological
and social sustainability.RESOURCE AVAILABILITY
Lead Contact
Further information and requests for resources should be
directed to and will be fulfilled by the Lead Contact, Pamela
McElwee (pamela.mcelwee@rutgers.edu).Materials Availability
This study did not generate new unique materials.Data and Code Availability
The data on existing and proposed COVID recovery plans






great-recovery-policies/. Links to the sources for specific mone-
tary values can be found via a dataset available at Mendeley:
https://doi.org/10.17632/whf4hkfwdx.1 and in Table S2.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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